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Introduction
Both the Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) 20101 and Lord Levene's
'Defence Reform' report of 20112 have again drawn attention to the variable
performance of the Ministry of Defence (MoD) in acquisition matters3 and highlighted
a number of underlying reasons along with a series of recommendations on how it
could address them. Such a situation, where the MoD has to conduct a major
transformation while managing a vast portfolio of activity, has been made all the
more critical by the impact of the financial crisis and economic recession. To help
reduce the UK's budgetary deficit, defence is expected to deliver savings estimated
at £4.3bn by 2014-15.4 This article looks at the current issues that are facing the UK
MoD during this time of transition in respect of defence acquisition.
A 'Growing' Inventory Problem
The first (on-going) issue was highlighted by the National Audit Office (NAO) in its
June 2012 report on the Defence Inventory.5 It observed that the MoD’s inventory
holdings are increasing, the result of an increase in operational activity over the past
decade, the acquisition of new equipment, a failure to dispose of unwanted
inventory, the purchase of more inventory than it uses and also acquiring a greater
visibility of its stock levels. The Head of the NAO observed that in “the current
economic climate where the Department is striving to make savings, it can ill-afford
to use resources to buy and hold unnecessary levels of stock, and it clearly does so.
The root cause of excess stock, which the Department is seeking to address, is that
management and accountability structures currently fail to provide the incentives for
cost-effective inventory management”.6 The Gross Book Value (GBV) of the Defence
inventory7 at the time of the Report’s publication was £40.3 billion, increasing at
approximately £200 million per month.
In recent years the MoD has instigated a number of initiatives to improve its
inventory position, and it has recently commissioned the development of a Strategic
Inventory Management Plan which is expected to be published in the near future. It
has also vested ‘ownership’ of the Defence inventory in the appointment of Director
General Resources in Defence Equipment & Support (DE&S) and he has issued
direction to the Operating Centres aimed at improving the scrutiny of equipment
support solutions, including their provision for inventory management. A number of
other studies and research projects are underway; some of them focusing on what
has been an enduring problem for the MoD: the disjointed nature of its logistics
information systems and the quality and availability of its spares demand and
consumption data. As the NAO observed, the ‘...Department’s use of information to
manage its supply chain falls short of general logistics industry best practice’.8
Future Force 2020, the Whole Force Concept and the Total Support Force
These issues are all linked. The SDSR outlined the model towards which the UK
Armed Forces will evolve in the next eight years, entitled 'Future Force 2020'.
Underpinning this is a new set of Defence Planning Assumptions (DPAs) that still
includes an ability to conduct a range of different operations.9 However, while being
couched in terms of making the UK Armed Forces more 'relevant' and 'effective' for
the 21st Century, if viewed alongside the reform of both the MoD and DE&S, it
involves a major reduction in defence capability for the UK in order for the MoD to
balance its books with the British Army shrinking from 102,600 to 82,00010 personnel
(the smallest it's been since the Boer War11), the Royal Navy shrinking by over 5,000
personnel to 30,000 and the Royal Air Force shrinking by over 7,000 to 33,000.12
The Whole Force Concept (WFC) was one of a range of ideas and initiatives to
emerge from the SDSR of 201013 and was formalized in Key Recommendation 11 of
the Defence Reform Review which stated that the MoD ". . . should develop the
‘Whole Force Concept,’ which seeks to ensure that Defence is supported by the
most cost-effective balance of regular military personnel, reservists, MOD civilians
and contractors."14 It was emphasized by the Independent Commission to Review
the UK’s Reserve Forces15 that the WFC should not be thought of as representing a
rigidly definable structure and the Commission stressed its dynamic nature.
In addition to a review of reserve forces, a number of other enabling studies and
initiatives underpin the WFC. Amongst them was how a new employment model
could be structured, based on ‘...flexible structures, segmented careers, categories
of readiness, and the mix of Regulars and Reserves with graduated commitment, set
within a tri-Service structure, with options for full and part time working’.16 Other
reviews have focused on strategic force development and on force generation.
However, in order to turn the concepts of both the WFC and Total Support Force
(TSF – an important part of the WFC) into concrete reality will require that the mix of
Armed Forces Regulars and Reservists, MoD civil servants, and contractors, is
optimized. To achieve this optimization will demand the balancing of affordability and
operational risk.
The Commission recognized the critical contribution of the reserves to the WFC but
also the need for their quality and availability to be guaranteed. This would, they
said, require an improvement in the proposition (prospects, responsibilities and
rewards of service) to the reservists, a change in legislation to enable more routine
mobilization, better employer support and employment protection, and better
methods to achieve the integration of Regulars and Reservists. Work done by the
Commission suggested that the UK could also learn much from the experience of its
ABCA17 partners who employ a whole force approach.
The MoD’s vision for the TSF is of an end-to-end support force ‘...capable of
deploying and operating with fully integrated support capabilities derived from a pre-
planned mix of military and civilian individuals and organisations’.18 It requires that
Reservists and contractors be integrated into Regular force structures against
readiness assumptions and force generation requirements. It envisages ‘...the
greater planned use of contractors on operations, in functions that are
commensurate with the category of threat level in order to accommodate force
protection and duty of care responsibilities, normally with an increasingly higher
proportion of contractors on successive roulements for enduring operations’.19
The UK MoD has outsourced much of its support capability, with many of its major
platforms and equipment assets having long-term contracts for availability (CfA); and
securing the provision of commodities and services through a range of other
contracting arrangements. One indication of this is the number of contractors
deployed in support of UK operations, with around 6,000 currently in Afghanistan.
This represents a ratio of two contractors for every three uniformed military
personnel.20 However, the provision of this support has not been as coherent as the
MoD would wish, a problem which the TSF is intended to address by bringing
greater coherence to the integration of Regulars, Reservists and industry personnel,
forming a single support force along the end-to-end Joint Support Chain. The scale
and scope of industry commitment to operations will be shaped by their attitude to
risk and what they deem to be an acceptable balance of risk and reward. To make
such an informed assessment will require the sharing of information, including that
associated with the risks inherent in deployed operations. This will require a change
of mindset, based on the principle of ‘need to share’ rather than ‘need to know’, and
it will also demand greater integration of MoD and industry IT systems.
MoD Reform
While it is encouraging that the MoD has recognised the need for change and has
put in place a set of governance structures in order to enable that to happen, to work
effectively these arrangements need:21
• A unified vision of the Department's structure, efficiently and effectively delivering
defence capability, and how to get there;
• The determination of necessary cultural change,, such change to be properly led
and sustained along with revised processes and procedures;
• United, consistent and strong leadership throughout the entire process;
• The Permanent Under Secretary (PUS) to have the appropriate responsibility and
authority to undertake this transformation.
In line with this, a transformation package consisting of a portfolio of thirty-seven
programmes with an additional ten deliverables was put together, which are split into
three tiers of descending importance. This activity is led by the Defence Operating
Board (Transformation), supported by the Defence Transformation Unit (DTU). This
meets once a week and is co-chaired by the Second PUS and Vice Chief of the
Defence Staff, with the Director General Finance being the other permanent
member, and both the Director General Transformation and Director Corporate
Strategy attending regularly.22
However, all this has meant an emphasis on short-term cost reduction. The Defence
budget has a relatively high-level of fixed costs in the short-term, and a significant
proportion, in both operational expenditure terms and acquisition terms, is committed
years in advance. Given that personnel costs comprise over one third of the budget,
a large proportion of the savings the MoD needs to make will come from reducing
personnel numbers, and the numbers outlined in the SDSR were subsequently
revised upwards in the spring of 2011 to 29,000 civilians and 25,000 military.23
Given that the MoD is still developing the details associated with Lord Levene's new
operating model24, the reductions in personnel numbers will be well advanced before
the final details have been worked out. This means that these reductions will have
been put into effect while there is still a significant lack of clarity as to exactly what
the MoD's requirements will be with regard to its future workforce, in terms of both
numbers and makeup. In being pressured to reduce costs in the short-term, and
looking to do so via reducing personnel, the MoD faces a serious impact on morale
as well as critical skill shortages in the future with consequent effects on its
consultancy expenditure.25
DE&S Reform
Reform of DE&S was a key part of Lord Levene's report into reforming the MoD26,
the Defence Materiel Strategy (DMS)27 and Bernard Gray's report of 2009.28 While
some progress has been made, there is still much to do. Over the last fifteen years,
numerous initiatives have attempted to reform defence acquisition but with variable
success as there is still (on average) a forty percent increase in the projected cost of
new equipment and an eighty percent increase in the time taken to field it. Analysis
identified three underlying causes:29
• The overheated programme;
• A weak interface between DE&S and the wider MoD resulting in poor discipline
and change control;
• Insufficient levels of business capability in DE&S for the size and complexity of
the programmes it is asked to deliver.
In order to address these problems, the DMS has considered various organisation
design options to move away from the current structures that have hindered past
attempts at improving defence acquisition, with three options being presented to
Ministers:30
• A Trading Fund (TF);
• An Executive, Non-Departmental Public Body with a Strategic Partner
(ENDPB/SP);
• A Government Owned – Contractor Operated (GOCO) entity.
While the MoD has been moving towards favouring the GOCO option31, a number of
questions remain unanswered, which include:32
• What would be the impact on timelines, the decision making process and
autonomy?
• Would bureaucracy increase or decrease?
• What impact would it have on the opportunities for smaller businesses?
• How would a lead company to run DE&S be chosen?
• How long would the contract be for?
• What financial risks would a DE&S lead company be asked to take on board?
• How would a GOCO be held accountable by Parliament?
Unfortunately, the failure by G4S to deploy the security personnel it was contracted
to provide for the Olympic Games, and the need for the MoD to cover the shortfall,
has raised doubts about the appropriateness of the GOCO option. G4S’s failure has
meant that the Secretary of State for Defence is "rethinking his attitude to private
sector acquisition" and learning about "when it was appropriate to adopt either
model".33
Conclusion
For most organisations, any one of these issues would be a major challenge,
involving a significant amount of time and effort to properly and effectively deal with it
in such a way as to leave the organisation in good shape to face the future. Such a
challenge would be complicated by having to do it during a time of austerity, with
pressure to make savings in its budget, itself a major driver of the restructuring
process. The MoD has to restructure itself, its central acquisition body, and the
armed forces themselves as well as deal with a significant problem with regard to an
on-going accumulation of inventory. All this, involving a major reduction in both
civilian and military personnel numbers, needs an effective and workable change
management strategy, as well as a change in the culture of the organisation and
staff behaviours – only time will tell if they succeed.
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